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RECENT DECISIONS
go only to prove or disprove the reasonableness of the contract. Nordenfelt v.
Nordenfelt, (1894) Ap. Cas. 535; 8 Harv. L. Rev. 355 (1895). The.plaintiff
must show there was a valid consideration. Durbrow Con'm. Co. v. Donner, 201
Wis. 175, 229 N.W. 635 (1930); that the breach causes irreparable damage.
Berlin v. Perry, supra. But if the contract is valid there is a property right to be
protected. Palmer v. Tots, 96 Wis. 367, 71 N.W. 654 (1897), and equity alone
can furnish adequate relief. Eureka Laundry Co. v. Long, supra; My Laundry
Co. v. Schmeling, 129 Wis. 597, 109 N.W. 540 (1906). The restraining clause
must be ancillary to a contract for the transfer of the good will or other subject of property or to an existing employment or contract for employment.
Restatement, Sec. 515-b; Chain Belt Co. v. Von Spreckelsen, 117 Wis. 106, 94
N.W. 78 (1903). It has been held that it is sufficient if the employee contracted
not to cause the damage which would result from his competing with the employer after he left his employ, where the employee had personal contact with
the customers and the employer did not. Eureka Laundry Co. v. Long, supra. If
the terms of the contract indicate that it is unreasonable, because it extends over
too long a period or too large a space, there is a conflict of authority as to whether
a court should grant a decree enjoining the defendant as to a reasonable time
and space. The court did so in Whiting v. O'Connel, (lass. 1931), 179 N.E.
169, but this decision was criticized as being a peculiar doctrine to Missachusetts and Kentucky; that courts should not aid an employer who uses his advantage over an employee to frame an unreasonable restraining clause. 45 Harv.
L. Rev. 751 (1932). Where the contract is unreasonable- as a whole, but the
language permits a construction that it is severable, it will be enforced within
such smaller limits as are reasonable, but if such smaller limits are not defined
by the contact itself the court cannot say how much is a reasonable restraint
and enforce that. General Bronze Corp. v. Schineling (Wis. 1932), 245 N.W. 469;
20 Harv. L. Rev. 154 (1906). Where areas are disjunctively described there is
a proper basis for dividing the covenant and enforcing it in the territory which
is properly restricted. General Bronze Co. v. Schmeling, supra. In the present
case there is no indication that the contract was severable, and the court refused to grant an injunction as to a reasonable territory. The present contract
is unreasonable in the light of present financial conditions. The present case does
not overrule the Eureka Laundry Co. case, but indicates that such contracts may
be reasonable in prosperous times, but unreasonable in times of depression.
JOHN

F.

SAVAGE

FIxTURES-MIECHANIcS LIENS-CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACrs.-Defendant,
conditional vendor of machinery under an unrecorded agreement, contested plaintiff constructor's suit against principal defendant to foreclose a mechanic's lien on
building, machinery, and leasehold of a rendering plant, asking that such machinery be exempt from the lien. A finding that the machinery was permanently annexed to said realty raised the question of whether plaintiff's lien covered machinery, now annexed to realty, sold under a conditional sales agreement without
notice to the plaintiff lienor. Held, that trade fixtures permanently affixed to the
realty are subject to mechanic's liens unaffected by conditional sales contracts
of which lienors had no notice. Geer Co. v. Wolcott et al. (Neb. 1933), 246 N.W.
456.
The annexation of fixtures to realty raises perplexing questions in this regard, and the decisions are by no means uniform. Practically all the cases hold
notice prerequisite to the preservation of the conditional vendor's rights against
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the lienor. Landreth Mach. Co. v. Roney, 185 Mo. App. 474, 171 S.W. 681 (1914) ;
Sowden & Co. v. Craig, 26 Ia. 156, 96 Am. Dec. 125 (1868); St. Mary's Mach.
Co. v. Iola Mills Co., 97 Kans. 464, 155 Pac. 1077 (1916) ; King v. Blickgeldt, 111
Wash. 508, 191 Pac. 748 (1920). It is on this ground that the instant case is
decided. In re Superior Drop Forge & Mfg. Co., 208 Fed. 813 (N.D. Ohio E.D.
1913) creates an apparent exception, holding that an express agreement that
property will remain personalty defeats the lienor's priority; but applies this
rule only when the property can be removed without damage to the realty. What
notice is sufficient to defeat the lienor's right is a disputed question. Whether the
recording of a chattel mortgage or conditional sales contract binds an encumbrancer of realty without notice is not decided in the instant case, but the courts
are clearly divided with Illinois, Sword v. Low, 122 Ill. 487, 13 N.E. 826 (1887) ;
New Jersey, Keeler v. Keeler, 31 N.J.E. 181 (1879) ; New York, Ford v. Cobb,
20 N.Y. 344 (1859); and the Federal courts, In re Atlantic Beach Corp., 244
Fed. 828 (S.D. Fla. 1917), holding that it does; and New Hampshire, Tibbets
v. Home, 65 N.H. 242, 23 A. 145 (1889) ; Ohio, Brennan v. Whitaker, 15 Oh. St.
446 (1864); and Texas, Phillips v. Newsonte, 179 S.W. 1123 (Tex. Civ. App.
1915), taking a contrary stand. At any rate actual notice is preferable to constructive notice by recording. Where no ground of lack of notice was present,
conditiobal vendor's rights have come before those of mechanic lienors. Sowden & Co. v. Craig, supra, which holds that annexation to realty did not extinguish conditional sales vendor's rights, even though the article was sold expressly
for annexation. Likewise a chattel mortgage prevails over a mechanic's lien
where sufficient notice is had. Edwards & B. Lminber Co. v. Rank, 57 Neb. 323,
77 N.W. 765 (1899). One case goes to the extreme and declares that the very
act of recording prevents annexation and ipso facto bars mechanic lienholders.
St. Mary's Mach. Co. v. Iola Mill & Elevator Co., supra. In Wisconsin the exact
situation has not yet come up, but Kendall Mfg. Co. v. Rundle, 78 Wis. 150, 47
N.W. 364 (1890), passing upon the Wisconsin statute (Cf. 289.01 Wis. Stats.
(1931) declaring that "such lien shall be prior to any other lien which originates
subsequent to the commencement of the construction and repairs," holds that a
mechanic's lien has priority over a recorded chattel mortgage. It is very likely
then that in this state the conditional vendor's only remedy would be the filing
of a materialman's lien, and thus come in on an equal basis with the mechanic
lienholder.
EDWARD HERMSEN

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-VILLAGES-FINDINGS

OF FAcT.-An application by

taxpayers residing within a particular area for the incorporation of such area
as the village of St. Francis was objected to by the city of Milwaukee and
eleven electors and taxpayers residing within s iid territory. Although the right
of the city of Milwaukee to object under an annexation petition signed by no
electors and one-half of the property owners of a certain area was denied, the
application for incorporation was not granted, the trial court finding that the
territory involved was largely rural in character and concluding that the sector
did not have the necessary characteristics to entitle it to be incorporated as a
village. Appeal taken. Held, Affirmed; evidenced found to support trial court's
conclusion. In re Village of St. Francis, (Wis. 1933), 245 N.W. 841.
There is no constitutional limitation upon the power of the Wisconsin legislature to incorporate cities or villages, as to area and density of population, except such as may be implied from the use of the words, "cities and villages,"

